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1.    Introduction 
 
European Union (EU) agri-environmental programmes (AEPs) represent a 
significant step in the region’s efforts to decouple agricultural output from production 
and export subsidies. While AEPs comprise only a small share of EU agricultural 
support, they have two possible external impacts: 1) the composition of the EU’s 
imports and exports may change as their producers become more market responsive; 
and 2) the WTO’s Green Box (subsides considered minimally trade distorting and hence 
not disciplined) may become increasingly contentious. Our concern is with the drivers of 
AEPs in the EU and their implications for Canada. 
 
2.   Brief History 
 
AEPs were introduced in the 1980s on a piece-meal and ad hoc basis. They 
became a significant and integrated part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the 
Agenda 2000 reforms, which divided the EU agricultural budget into two pillars: Pillar 1 - 
that funds traditional price support programs; and Pillar 2 – that pays for the Rural 
Development Regulations, allocations made by each member-state towards the 
development of its rural areas. Pillar 2 payments include the AEPs. Rural development 
regulations and AEPs are cost-shared by members with Brussels, and members are at 
liberty to allocate funds within rural development programs as they wish.  As a result, 
there is a large variance in the number and cost of these programmes among members. 
Producers are not required to cost-share.  
 
EU agri-environmental policy has been directed both at discouraging the 
negative externalities resulting from agricultural production and rewarding the 
production of public goods. Organic farming, for example, is considered less intensive 
and therefore a more “nature friendly” form of production; a subsidy for converting to 
organic farming is the only AEP measure common to all member-states. European 
taxpayers seem to be demanding both organically grown products and exhibiting a 
willingness to pay for the increase in biodiversity which accompanies organic 
production. 
 
The EU is also particularly concerned about land-abandonment in southern 
member-states such as Spain and Portugal, and also in some wealthier member-states 
where agri-tourism is economically important, such as Austria. To halt abandonment, 
farmers in borderline areas receive subsidies which are large enough to keep them on 
the land and cultivating it.  A requirement is that the land be maintained in good 
agricultural condition, which precludes afforestation and the loss of scenic upland 
pastures. Other available AEPs are designed to preserve rare animal breeds, provide 
rights of way for ramblers, and to train young farmers. 
 
AEPs are not the only form of incentive for making agricultural production more 
environmentally friendly.  Cross-compliance with environmental regulations has been 
compulsory since 2005, meaning that farmers receiving Pillar 1 money must use good 
farming standards on all of their land. As virtually all EU farmers receive Pillar 1   2
subsidies, this has meant a general improvement in environmental standards 
throughout the EU. 
 
3.   European Motivation Behind Agri-environmental Programs 
 
What are the motivations behind the EU’s adoption of AEPs?  Is AEP uptake 
driven by concerns over pollution, by politics, or by both?  An understanding of 
motivation helps to answer other questions, such as whether or not AEPs are 
negotiable in the WTO as a part of Green Box reforms and if these programs will be 
expanded in the future.  
 
We suggest there are four possible motivations for AEPs and that our analysis 
can best be understood by viewing the results through a “lens”, with each lens 
representing one of the four possible motivations: 1) cynical lens; 2) budgetary lens; 3) 
green demand lens; and 4) pollution lens. It should be understood that a combination of 
lenses is not only possible, but probable. 
 
Canada and the United States have made no secret of their concerns over EU 
agricultural production subsidies on the grounds of their trade-distorting effects. 
Programmes which make use of the Green Box to transfer funds to farmers may be 
seen as the EU’s response to such concerns. The first two lenses present AEPs as a 
clear result of a political bargain, whereas the second two project AEPs as efficient 
market interventions. The trade lens views AEPs as converted price supports, the 
implication being that the agricultural lobby was firmly behind their introduction.  The 
second explanation is provided by the budgetary lens - in the 1980s the EU was 
almost insolvent because of the costs of agricultural subsidies, and some change was 
inevitable, particularly in light of the EU expansion.  The view through the budgetary 
lens is that AEPs are primarily a response to the EUs fiscal concerns, and that the 
European Commission garnered support from environmentalists to reduce direct price 
supports.  The important difference between the trade and budgetary lenses is not the 
value of the subsidies being paid to farmers, but its intention. The trade lens takes the 
continued high cost of European agriculture as proof that the agricultural lobby has 
maintained its influence (and would therefore be reticent to accept further cuts in 
payments) while the budgetary lens implies production quantities are being reduced, 
and AEPs are a way to make output cuts more politically palatable by leveraging 
support from environmentalists. The third explanation is green demand: EU taxpayers 
might prefer a more aesthetically pleasing countryside and members are responding to 
this demand.  Under this interpretation AEPs are designed to reward farmers for their 
valued but non-marketed joint production, for example enhanced biodiversity, the sight 
of sheep grazing on Alpine pastures, and the preservation of rare breeds of 
domesticated animals.  The fourth lens is pollution, where AEPs are viewed as 
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4.   Results of Analysis 
 
Our analysis attempts to explain the factors that influence the fraction of each 
member states agricultural subsidies that go to AEPs, and by so doing, try to infer which 
of the above lenses does a better job of explaining the source of AEPs.  Specifically, we 
try to explain the factors influencing a member state’s AEP receipts from Brussels 
divided by that member-state's total agricultural receipts from Brussels. The explanatory 
variables are designed to capture agronomic, demographic, political and economic 
factors. To reflect negative externalities we include fertilizer and pesticide use per 
hectare, and to capture intensity, irrigation per hectare of farmed land. Demand for 
positive externalities is represented by the amount of domestic tourism, and an index 
representing how well the country has integrated environmental rules into its legislation. 
The strength of the farm lobby is measured by lagged agricultural expenditures.  Our 
hypothesis is that if AEPs are meant as a substitute for traditional agricultural subsidies, 
those regions who have had the highest levels of subsidies should have the highest rate 
of converting those subsidies into AEPs. The percentage of the population living in rural 
areas, and the percentage of the workforce in agriculture also help to capture the 
strength of the agriculture lobby. Cross-compliance with environmental regulations was 
not compulsory during the period of analysis. We use a before-and-after variable to 
measure the effect, if any, of producers demanding more agri-environmental funding as 
compensation for undertaking more environmentally friendly production practices. 
Political variables such as the percentage of seats elected using proportional 
representation is used to represent the voice of environmentalists, and whether MEPs 
are elected regionally (as opposed to nationally) is used to represent the voice of 
agriculture and rural interests.   
 
We find there is evidence that the stronger the agricultural lobby, the greater the 
demand for traditional price supports, and the greater the resistance to converting those 
supports to AEPs. However we also find that those countries that are spending the most 
on price supports are also converting a higher percentage of their expenditure to AEPs, 
perhaps providing evidence of AEPs being compensation for the loss of production 
subsidies.  
 
Unsurprisingly those members with “green credentials” spent a higher proportion 
of their total agricultural budget on AEPs.  For example, those member-states in which 
environmental concerns are given voice through the use of proportional representation 
spend proportionally more on AEPs.  Further, those countries that have done the best 
job in integrating other environmental rules into their (non-agricultural) legislation are 
also spending the highest portion on AEPs.   
 
Member-states with the worst pollution problems do not spend the most to 
address these problems. At the same time, member-states with the most intensive 
agricultural systems do not spend the most to reduce pollution from agriculture. 
Interestingly, the use of cross-compliance is negatively correlated with the percentage 
of AEP expenditure.  This result may be evidence that the environmental restrictions on 
Pillar 1 production subsidies (effectively a stick) are acting as a substitute for AEPs   4
(which act as a carrot). In any case, it is clear that AEPs themselves are not going to 
those areas with the most significant pollution problems. 
 
5.    Results in Terms of the Four Lenses 
 
As we have noted above, the four 'lenses' are employed to illustrate possible 
motives for the use of AEPs.  From the above results, we find that the lens which 
receives the most support is the green demand lens, indicating that taxpayers in the 
EU are beginning to see agriculture not only as a source of food and fibre but also as a 
provider of the positive externalities of agriculture.  Conversely, there is little support for 
the pollution lens.  The fact that the green demand lens provides a stronger result than 
the pollution lens implies that taxpayers prefer (or are more aware) the positive 
externalities of agriculture to reducing agriculture's negative externalities. The pollution 
lens shows that the stick of cross-compliance is having some effect, but that AEPs are 
not going to the  areas with the greatest need for them. For example, subsidizing a 
highland pastoralist has little effect on pollution levels because the pastoralist is unlikely 
to be polluting very much anyway, and is equally unlikely to be able to reduce pollution. 
Meanwhile the heavy polluters continue because their higher profit margins enable them 
to be less reliant on AEPs for financial support. A similar view is revealed by the 
budgetary lens, showing that the EU may have unwittingly created a second claimant 
group. In other words, instead of changing the production techniques of its heaviest 
polluters, the EU has created a new class of claimants---such as the highland 
pastoralist---who offer little in return for the money. The trade  lens receives mixed 
support. Those countries which are spending the most on price-supports are also 
converting a higher percentage of their expenditure to AEPs. Thus it is possible that 
AEPs are being used as compensation for loss of price-supports but it is not clear that 
the 'loser' is in fact the one receiving the compensation.  Further, as indication that the 
agricultural lobby is not the driver behind AEPs, we find those characteristics associated 
with a stronger agricultural lobby lead to a decrease in AEPs. This result implies that the 
agricultural lobby has greater demand for traditional price-supports, and hence greater 
resistance to converting these supports to AEPs. This is intuitively correct: a well-
entrenched, productive and highly-capitalised agricultural sector is likely to prefer this 
form of funding compared to that which supports adoption of lower-yielding technology, 
such as that funded by AEPs.   These results are consistent with the budgetary lens, 
assuming the European Commission is using the AEPs as a means to reduce the 
budget, garnering support from environmental groups while trying to balance different 
farm groups against each other. 
 
6.   Relevance to Canada 
 
Our results show that the green taxpayer has apparently gained influence at the 
expense of the agricultural lobby. This should not be a surprise as there is anecdotal 
evidence for this shift, such as demonstrations against the planting of genetically-
modified crops, and the well-documented turning against conventional agriculture as a 
result of the food scares that took place during our study period. It seems that the 
European Commission has used this shift to enable a transfer of funds from price   5
supports to less distorting forms of agricultural subsidies such as AEPs. It is now the 
taxpayer rather than the consumer who is paying for the subsidies, and the process of 
subsidy is now more transparent or at least, less opaque.  As an agricultural exporter, 
Canada would presumably do well to encourage this shift, and therefore not place too 
strong a restriction on the use of these forms of green payments, especially as the 
growing strength of the environmental movement implies that external attempts to roll 
back AEPs may be opposed.   
 
There are however two sources of concern.  First, the AEPs are not going to the 
same farmers who originally received price-supports, and thus the EU has effectively 
created a new claimant group.  This result has two implications.  First, it will be hard to 
use AEPs to compensate those producers receiving CAP subsidies for further 
reductions in domestic support and second, if AEPs do become of concern, it will be 
difficult to remove them.  The second concern is the current lack of targeting of these 
programs.  The funds do not seem to be directed at the regions with the most severe 
environmental problems.  This provides an opportunity for the EU's trading partners to 
encourage increased targeting of these programs, which has the potential to increase 
their effectiveness at producing environmental goods while limiting any remaining 
production distorting outcomes they may have. 
 
7.   Conclusions 
 
Our results show that while there is evidence that AEPs are meeting demands 
from green consumers in the EU, they are not going (exclusively) to the same group 
that received the price supports. This limits their effectiveness as compensation and 
raises concerns about the creation of a new claimant group. However, it is likely that 
AEPs reduce trade distortions because they do divert some funds from production 
subsidies and encourage the adoption of technology that has lower yields.  In addition, 
AEPs are a halfway-house between production subsidies and no subsidy at all, and so 
those members that have been most reluctant to liberalize their agricultural markets 
may find them a useful stepping stone. For these reasons, international attempts to roll 
back AEPs are likely to be counterproductive.  
 
It is possible that the EU might attempt to expand AEPs or Pillar II funding in 
general.  Although not explicitly tied to output, these programs are still delivering funds 
to producers which can be production distorting.  In this case, a policy strategy might be 
to require greater targeting to environmental goals, such as site-specific payments. 
 
The use of AEPs and conservation payments has increased in the past decade 
since the 1992 MacSharry reforms in the EU and with the 1996 and 2002 Farm Bills in 
the United States.  Much work has been done on the effectiveness of these programs in 
addressing the environmental externalities of agriculture, and some has been done as 
to their relationship with production subsidies (more in the United States).  However, 
little work has been done on the political economy of these programs, and even less as 
a joint product of a political bargain among farmers, consumers and environmentalists.  
Our Commissioned Paper is a first attempt at exploring this political bargain, and   6
illustrates that constraints on these programs (such as could be imposed by trade 
agreements) cannot be considered in isolation of each other. 
 
 